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Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program and Implications for US National Security
Michael Tkacik

Abstract
This article analyzes Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and the characteristics of the
environment in which the program is nested. These characteristics include Pakistan’s
history of internal and external instability; nuclear saber rattling during crises; support for
Islamic terrorism in order to advance state goals; indigenous production of many
elements of its nuclear forces; possession of delivery and command and control systems
with destabilizing characteristics; and finally, nuclear doctrine that appears to advocate
first use of nuclear weapons. The article argues that the characteristics of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program generate threats to US national security interests. The article
examines six interrelated and synergistic challenges for US national security: first,
Pakistan is engaged in an arms race in Southwest Asia that has negative implications for
Pakistan’s stability; second, the threat of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan continues;
third, Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics make accidental and/or unauthorized nuclear war
more likely; fourth, there is an ongoing possibility of war with India; fifth, Islamist
influence is spreading through key sectors of Pakistani society; and finally, there is an
increasing danger of state failure in Pakistan.
Key Words: Nuclear Weapons; Pakistan, US National Security; Terrorism; India;
Nuclear Proliferation.

INTRODUCTION
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program generates concern in Washington and among
its allies for a variety of reasons. There are concerns about the potential of nuclear war
with India, about proliferation, and about seizure by Islamist militants. These concerns
are legitimate to be sure. But a close examination of the program itself and the
environment in which that program nests raises a larger concern: the likelihood of a
synergistic interaction among these variables leading to even greater danger to US
security. This malevolent manifestation of unintended outcomes cannot be predicted, but
the way in which these dangers arise can be better understood. To this end, the article
examines the environment in which Pakistan’s program nests, how these environmental
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variables may interact, what sorts of dangers may arise therefrom, and how these
variables and dangers might themselves interact synergistically, leading to even greater
peril. The resulting hazards are more difficult to understand, less predictable, and thus
pose an even greater threat to US security than generally acknowledged. Because the
threats generated are more likely to have unintended consequences, it is more important
than ever to plan for coherent, interconnected responses.
ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
To best understand Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, it is essential to
understand Pakistan’s relationship with India. Pakistan’s relationship with India is
perhaps more complicated than the relationship United States shares with any state,
including nuclear-armed states. Pakistan and India were born together of the
subcontinent. And as a sibling rivalry can be far more complex than any “normal” rivalry,
so too is the rivalry between Pakistan and India. India is, first and foremost, far larger and
more powerful than Pakistan. Nothing can change this geopolitical and economic fact,
though Pakistan does hope to mute this difference through the possession of nuclear
weapons. The weapons are viewed as the single possible equalizer between the two
states.1
Pakistan and India have also fought three major wars since 1947. In each
of these wars Pakistan suffered defeat on some level. In the 1971 war particularly,
Pakistan saw itself dismembered, with its eastern portion being granted independence as
Bangladesh. The result of this war made clear to Pakistani elites that they could not hope
to defeat or even fight India to a draw if India sought to fully impose its will. In the
immediate aftermath of the 1971 war, Pakistan decided to move forward decisively and
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develop nuclear weapons over all other national goals including economic development,
political development, and conventional military development.2 Since then, Pakistan has
become proficient at asymmetrical warfare at both ends of the spectrum, whether through
the development of nuclear weapons or by developing more traditional asymmetrical
power such as terrorism and the use of irregulars.
Religious differences help explain the deep animosity between Pakistan and India.
Pakistan has always seen Islam as part and parcel of its national identity. But the intensity
of these religious feelings, and the distance to which elites have been willing to go to take
advantage of religion, have increased markedly over time. Initially, Pakistani elites
sought to minimize the involvement of religion with state. But as the country faced
pressures, both internal and external, religion became the one unifying feature that elites
could turn to and increasingly they did just that. Religion was a way of uniting Pakistanis
against India as well as a way of garnering external support. When the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan, religion was again invoked (with US encouragement) to rally
Muslims from around the world against the Soviets.3 Pakistan has also used “jihad” to
wage irregular war against India in Kashmir. Pakistan’s military governments too have
used religion against domestic foes, especially pro-democracy groups.4 Finally, India in
the late 1990s itself began to increasingly use religion as a method of mobilizing the
masses. Thus Hindu fundamentalism, as manifested in the nationalistic BJP in India, met
Islamic fundamentalism.5 These religious tensions therefore expanded beyond the
disputed Kashmir region where they had previously been central and began to take center
stage in many facets of the states’ relations. This is particularly disturbing for nuclear
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deterrence theory because religious differences are often perceived as zero-sum. The
Indo-Pakistani hostility has manifested itself most dangerously during nuclear crises.
NUCLEAR CRISES
Since the 1980s, the relationship between Pakistan and India has stumbled from
one crisis after another. These crises have been characterized by nuclear brinkmanship.
Though such nuclear brinkmanship was implicit in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, by
the late 1990s and early in the 21st century such brinkmanship had become explicit. At
least for Pakistan’s military this brinkmanship evidences successful nuclear deterrence of
its more powerful neighbor.6
The Brasstacks crisis of 1986-1987 arose out of a large-scale November 1986
India training exercise close to Pakistan’s border in Rajastan (a likely Indian jumping off
point for any future war with Pakistan). The exercises were of unprecedented size and
included most of India’s armored formations. Tactical nuclear weapons were included in
the exercises. Pakistan viewed the exercises as threatening (indeed they could have been
a cover for military strikes) and responded with its own large scale exercises near Punjab.
Each state thereafter engaged in further threatening maneuvers heightening the crisis. In
January 1987 A.Q. Khan allegedly revealed to the press that Pakistan had enriched
uranium and could simulate a nuclear weapons test. The article that contained Khan’s
comments was not published until 1 March, by which time the crisis had started to wind
down. Still, the Khan threat is widely perceived in Pakistan as having been a successful
threat of nuclear weapons use against India. Additionally, Pakistan “reportedly made a
veiled nuclear threat to the Indian ambassador in Islamabad in an effort to contain and
defuse the crisis.”7 Moreover, there are reports that India intended a preventative attack
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against Pakistan at this time to foreclose Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons.
Whatever the veracity of these reports, they are widely accepted in Pakistan. Thus the
lesson Pakistan’s military drew from Brasstacks was that nuclear threats work. For the
purposes of this article the perceptions in Pakistan of how this crisis was resolved are just
as important as the reality.8
In early 1990 another crisis occurred, this time in Kashmir. Although one might
argue Kashmir is in a perpetual state of crisis, in this particular case it was a combination
of ongoing tensions within Kashmir, a violent Indian crackdown, and an increase in
Pakistani-sponsored militant activity (as well as a failure to withdraw Pakistani troops
who participated in earlier exercises in the area), which in turn led to an Indian military
build-up not just in Kashmir but also south into Punjab.9 In February India also deployed
units for armored exercises far to the southwest in Rajasthan, evoking images of
Brasstacks.10 Pakistan’s leadership responded itself with a further troop build-up.
Tensions increased, additional units were deployed and/or alerted, and once again the
possibility of uncontrolled escalation loomed.11 Some have minimized this crisis, noting
that much of the Indian deployment was infantry-based and directed at stopping crossborder infiltration from Pakistan into Kashmir.12 But the deployments went beyond
Kashmir and in any event it is not clear that Pakistani intelligence interpreted the Indian
build-up in this fashion. In March and April the capitals exchanged threats, including
some that later observers have interpreted as nuclear.13 By mid-April Pakistan believed
“India had deployed a strike force of up to 100,000 men within fifty miles of the border
in Rajasthan.”14 This southwestern deployment raised the possibility of a decapitating
attack designed to split Pakistan or at least prevent the movement of troops toward
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Kashmir in the northeast. Again some observers assert that, notwithstanding such
deployments, neither side deployed the armor necessary to support such a strike.15
Whatever the actual deployments, leaders in the United States were growing
concerned. A US diplomatic mission was sent to both India and Pakistan in May 1990
and by June 1990 the crisis had abated. Although there is debate about how close this
crisis came to conventional or nuclear war, most analysts believe nuclear weapons played
some role. Seymour Hersh, in what many in the scholarly community have concluded is a
sensationalized account, argues the two states were at the brink of nuclear war, with
Pakistan having deployed nuclear weapons on F-16s that were held on runway alert.16
Devin Hagerty and others claim no such alerts existed. But Hagerty nevertheless argues
that existential nuclear deterrence (caution induced by the very existence of nuclear
weapons or at least the ability to assemble them relatively quickly) helped to prevent the
crisis from exploding.17 P.R. Chari credits the United States diplomatic mission with
defusing the crisis.18 For the purposes of this article, two points are important. First, the
1990 crisis was the second serious crisis in only three years for the two states. “U.S.
intelligence estimated there was a 50-50 chance of war.”19 India definitely had a nuclear
capability at this point and, given A.Q. Khan’s comments during Brasstacks, there is
strong evidence that Pakistan had at least a fledgling capability.20 Vague nuclear threats
were again part of the political communications exchanged between the two states.
Second, whether this crisis was close to nuclear war or whether nuclear weapons
provided a backdrop for the crisis, nuclear weapons were part of the calculus present
during the crisis. From the Pakistani security establishment’s perspective, they were
threatened by a conventionally superior power, one that had convincingly defeated
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Pakistan three times in the past, and yet Pakistan was able to stand that power down, at
least in part through veiled nuclear threats. “The restraint imposed by the nuclear factor
on the conventional military confrontation between India and Pakistan was all too
obvious.”21 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was thus validated for the second time
in only three years.
Some have claimed that after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 India prepared for
preemptive strikes against Pakistani nuclear facilities. At least one source claims that in
response, Pakistan deployed Ghauri ballistic missiles to stress its ability to retaliate. Some
have even said the missiles were mated with nuclear warheads. The preemptive strike did
not occur and, if the Ghauri’s did deploy, this would again indicate to Pakistani
authorities that the weapons have utility.22
The next severe crisis occurred in 1999 in Kargil. Observers believe the Kargil
crisis arose out of Pakistani military attempts to negate India’s seizure of the Siachin
Glacier in 1984. At Kargil, Pakistani controlled forces occupied high mountain positions
on India’s side of the Line of Control that Indian had abandoned for the winter months.
Control over these positions would allow Pakistan to interdict supply lines to the Siachin
Glacier.23 India learned of Pakistan’s presence in May 1999. Many analysts believe that
Pakistan’s military presumed India would not risk a serious conventional conflict with
Pakistan in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests. At the same time, Pakistan’s government
hoped the danger created by this crisis would bring about international intervention to
resolve the larger Kashmir dispute on terms favorable to Pakistan. Some of Pakistan’s
calculations appear to have been correct. India did not horizontally escalate and strike
Pakistan elsewhere (though India did deploy troops elsewhere). But India did attack

7

Pakistani forces at Kargil. While both sides suffered significant casualties (over 1,000
dead in total), India was eventually able to dislodge Pakistani forces. 24 Indian forces did
not however attack Pakistani forces over the LOC and limited their attacks to the
immediate Kargil area. But the international support Pakistan had hoped for was not
forthcoming. To the contrary, the United States intervened politically and brokered a
Pakistani withdrawal.
Much has been written about the application of the stability/instability paradox in
the Kargil context. The arguments are somewhat confused because they ultimately rest on
antecedent assumptions about whether or not the strategic (i.e., nuclear) situation is
indeed, stable or unstable at its heart. Nevertheless, regional scholars often argue that
Kargil is an example of the stability/instability paradox whereby the stability evoked by
the existence of nuclear weapons (and the concomitant undesirability of engaging in the
sort of serious conventional conflict that could lead to a nuclear exchange) also made
lesser forms of conflict (such as Kargil) attractive to Pakistan.25 The argument claims
Pakistan, as a revisionist power, sought to change the status quo by seizing Kargil and
then daring India to take a risk in conventionally escalating, as Pakistan believed would
be necessary to evict its forces from Kargil. In essence, nuclear weapons provided cover
for low intensity conflict. Significant escalation would have risked nuclear war and
Pakistan felt India would not take such a risk. Once again, Pakistan is alleged to have
made nuclear threats during the crisis to underline the danger of escalation.26 Sources
indicate no fewer than 13 threats between officials of the two states from 26 May to 30
June.27 Pakistani leadership further felt that the international community would quickly
intervene to avert nuclear crisis and allow Pakistan to keep its gains. As it turned out,
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India managed to restore the status quo ante without significant escalation. India gained
the upper hand militarily and won international support, which in combination led to
Pakistan’s withdrawal. But for Pakistan’s military, this once again showed the value of
nuclear weapons in staring down its more powerful opponent. Even if Pakistan was
forced to back down in this case, just as clearly nuclear weapons seem to have prevented
Indian escalation and thus again proved their worth.28 From Pakistan’s point of view,
without nuclear weapons India would surely have escalated conventionally, both to
reduce its own casualties and to teach Pakistan a lesson as India had so often done in the
past.29
Though the resolution of Kargil initially reduced violence in Kashmir, tensions
soon increased once more. The 2001-2002 Border Confrontation crisis began on 13
December 2001 when terrorists supported by Pakistan’s ISI (Jaish-e-Mohammed and
Lashkar-e-Taiba militants) attacked the Indian Parliament.30 In fact, the precursor to this
attack was a 1 October 2001 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly. As
a result, India deployed at least 500,000 troops on its border with Pakistan including
significant offensively oriented assets, as well as air and naval forces.31 Pakistan’s
military deployed its forces in response. By early spring US intelligence officials were
publicly voicing concerns over war in Southwest Asia. There was, of course, an
associated risk of nuclear escalation in the region, either by design or mistake. In fact, on
14 May 2002 families of Indian military personnel were killed in Kaluchak by terrorists.
This is exactly the sort of spark some feared could lead to war and perhaps eventual
nuclear use. But there was no significant escalation of the ongoing crisis. As in other
Indo-Pakistani crises of the late 20th century, nuclear signaling seems to have played an
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important role.32 “These nuclear signals were multiple in kind, carried out at multiple
levels, and addressed to multiple constituencies – internal, regional, and international.”33
A combination of existential deterrence and US mediation helped to deescalate the crisis.
For purposes of this article, two different though not necessarily contradictory
conclusions can be drawn from the 2001-2002 crisis. First, the existential deterrence
generated by the presence of nuclear weapons seems to have induced caution on both
sides, but perhaps more so in India than Pakistan.34 Second, there remains a very real
chance of nuclear use in the region given the propensity of each side to resort to nuclear
saber rattling and other regional factors that may serve to weaken restraint at critical
junctures of some future crisis as discussed below (for example, deficiencies in
Pakistan’s arsenal, societal weaknesses in Pakistan, religious extremism, and so forth).
Though these conclusions seem contrary, it may instead be that a sort of especially fragile
existential deterrence exists in Southwest Asia that is susceptible to failure at some
critical but unknown future juncture. Each of the recent four Indo-Pakistani crises,
Brasstacks (1986-1987), Kashmir (1990), Kargil (1999), and 2001-2002, involved
numerous nuclear threats and only eventually ended with external mediation. Indeed it
may be that US diplomacy is especially important and a failure to intervene
diplomatically in the future could precipitate nuclear war. US diplomacy may have
maintained this fragile existential deterrence. Of course, other variables could also cause
a failure of nuclear deterrence, such as accident, miscalculation, or a loss of control over
the weapons. An examination of current developments in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program should give one pause for thought: Pakistan is developing a large, usable, and
modern arsenal, but one without the safety mechanisms and crisis tolerance other large
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arsenals include. Before examining these specifics, however, there is one final
environmental variable that needs to be examined.
LINKS TO ISLAMIC TERRORISM
Pakistani society has proven a fertile breeding ground for Islamist terrorism.
Some of the reasons for this terrorism can be traced to Afghanistan and Kashmir. But the
growth of the phenomenon also rests with the decisions of Pakistan’s government (of
course the policies of other states are also a causal variable).
Pakistan has used Islam as a domestic mobilizing factor since the state’s
inception. But the growth of violent Islamists really began when the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan supported the Afghan Mujahideen
almost from the beginning. The United States quickly ascertained that here was an
opportunity to bleed the Soviets, and thus supported Pakistan’s efforts with money,
weapons, and advice. Pakistan and the Mujahideen both used Islam to rally international
support – the war was fought as jihad against the infidel Soviets. The viciousness of the
conflict further radicalized these Islamic warriors, as did the influx of Arab radicals
whose home countries thought Afghanistan a good dumping ground for troublemakers.35
Once the Soviets were evicted, the Mujahideen turned against one and other. The
ongoing instability in Afghanistan worried Pakistan, so it helped to form and support the
Taliban, who eventually swept the other warlords from power. Pakistan thus achieved
some measure of “strategic depth” in its rear vis-à-vis India as well as a steady stream of
radicals for use elsewhere, such as Kashmir.
Another key linkage between Pakistan and Islamic terrorism exists in Kashmir.
Though Pakistan has been loath to directly confront the conventionally superior India, it
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has supported Kashmir rebels to a lesser or greater extent for years.36 Since 1990 in
particular, Pakistan has facilitated terrorism against Indian interests in Kashmir. And
Pakistan has again mobilized on the basis of Islam. The Pakistani Army finds a key
source of domestic legitimacy in its support for Kashmir insurgents. 37 This Pakistani
support has led to numerous crises, some of which have been examined above. But it has
also managed to keep pressure on India and has internationalized the crisis in a way that
Pakistan thought might encourage resolution.38
Both of these groups of terrorists, though once serving their Pakistani masters,
have proven somewhat harder to control when their interests diverged from those of
Pakistan. So by 2005 Pakistan no longer controlled its frontier regions bordering
Afghanistan, having ceded these to Taliban friendly militants or otherwise violent, Salafi
jihadist and/or Deobandi influenced groups. Similarly, Kashmir rebels sometime seem
intent on achieving their own agenda without regard for Pakistan’s goals.
The Pakistani environment (religiously, politically, and otherwise) is complex and
unstable. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program can best be understood as nested within
this social environment. As such, the characteristics of Pakistan’s program could either
reduce instability (perhaps through a clear increase in existential deterrence) or it could
further destabilize an already fragile environment. When one examines the various
characteristics of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, it becomes apparent that most
(though not all) factors mitigate in favor of further instability. This instability has
negative implications for US security interests.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS PRODUCTION
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Pakistan has a broad and well-developed nuclear infrastructure that has been
assisted variously by the US, by Europe, and most significantly by China.39 It has
indigenous uranium mines and uranium mills with which to produce yellowcake. The
yellowcake is fed into a local hexafluoride (UF6) conversion plant. Thereafter it can
placed on one of two paths: weapons grade uranium (highly enriched uranium – HEU) or
plutonium.
Pakistan produces HEU at one or more gas centrifuge facilities.40 The largest of
these enrichment facilities is located at Kahuta. Secondary facilities, possibly focused on
research or training, are located at Sihala, Golra Sharif, and maybe Gadwal (near Wah).41
From there, the HEU is sent into the weaponization process, including the formation of
pits, triggers, and other key mechanisms. Significant portions of this process may occur at
Kahuta and Wah. Pakistan is thought to be capable of producing between 55 and 95 kg of
HEU per year. Most open sources indicate Pakistan’s HEU based nuclear weapons are
implosion devices requiring between 15 and 20kgs of HEU per core. While Pakistan has
historically had greater success enriching uranium rather than extracting plutonium, it has
maintained a duel track approach, attempting to master both processes in order to give
itself more options for the production of nuclear weapons.
For Pakistan’s plutonium line, the yellowcake is fabricated into reactor fuel for
Pakistan’s heavy water reactors. The fuel is fabricated at Kundian and possibly near
Chashma as well. Pakistan is capable of producing the heavy water necessary to moderate
these reactors. The heavy water production facility is located at Multan. There may also
be a facility in Khushab. The heavy water reactors associated with plutonium production
are located at Khushab (Khushab-1). Khushab-1 is thought to produce about 10kgs of
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plutonium per year. Throughout the 1990s the Khushab-1 (40-50 megawatts thermal)
reactor produced spent fuel which was then taken to a reprocessing plant known as “New
Labs” in Rawalpindi. New Labs was able to chemically separate about 10-20kgs of
plutonium annually using the PUREX method.42 It therefore appears that Khushab-1
produces just about as much spent fuel as New Labs can reprocess. 43 It should be noted
that Khushab-1 can also produce tritium, which can be used to boost the yield of certain
weapons and otherwise refine nuclear weapons.
A second heavy water reactor has been under construction at Khushab (Khushab2) since 2000.44 Although some analysts initially speculated that Khushab-2 might be a
1,000 megawatt thermal output reactor, most analysts now argue the reactor is not nearly
so large.45 Still, it is unclear from open sources whether Khushab-2 will be similar to
Khushab-1’s 50 megawatt thermal output (as some US government officials have
asserted) or will be somewhere between 70-130 megawatt thermal output (as some
private analysts have argued).46 Whatever the case, this represents at minimum a
doubling of Pakistan’s plutonium production possibilities. The problem for Pakistan is
that New Labs may already be at or near maximum capacity.47 Thus it is likely that an
expansion of an existing facility or a separate reprocessing facility is necessary. Pakistan
may be doing both by expanding the New Labs facility and restarting construction at
Chashma, the site of a terminated 1970s French reprocessing facility.48 Construction on
the new Chashma reprocessing facility began about the same time as Khushab-2.49 The
Chashma reprocessing facility under construction may have the capability to reprocess
fuel in excess of that which will be produced by Khushab-2.50 Indeed, a third heavy water
reactor, Khushab-3, is also under construction.51 Though Khushab-3 was also once
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claimed to be in the “several hundred megawatts thermal” area, most analysts seem to be
settling for somewhere between 50-100 megawatts thermal.52 Whatever the precise
capabilities of these new reactors, there is little doubt that Pakistan will soon, at a
minimum, double its plutonium production capabilities. Once Khushab-3 comes on line,
that capacity will grow further.53 Of course, at some point Pakistan’s ability to produce
enough heavy water for these facilities will come under strain, so we might expect to see
an expansion of capabilities in this area as well.54 Plutonium allows Pakistan to diversify
its nuclear weapons arsenal, to create lighter weapons (possibly for use on cruise
missiles, see below), to create greater yields, and eventually may lead to a thermonuclear
capability.55 In particular, the increase in plutonium production presages a move toward
more reliance on missile delivery systems, because plutonium weapons can be made
smaller than HEU based weapons.56
Understanding the number and type of HEU and plutonium production facilities,
as well as when they became operational, allows one to make educated guesses about
how much weapons grade material has been produced by Pakistan. 57 These numbers are
necessarily ranges because we cannot be sure about the capacity at which each facility
has been operating. It is estimated that Pakistan is able to enrich between 80-140kgs of
uranium per year at Kahuta, or enough to produce 4-8 bombs per year. It is estimated that
Khushab-1 produces 10-20kgs of plutonium per year, or enough for 2-3 plutonium
weapons per year. Of course, Pakistan may be using uranium and plutonium in the same
weapon. The range of HEU and plutonium produced in total by Pakistan runs from 1175
– 2020 kg and 95 – 115 kg, respectively.58 It is typically estimated that Pakistan’s HEU
devices require between 15-20 kg each, while plutonium devices require between 4-5 kg

15

each.59 Thus, at the beginning of 2008 a number of open sources estimated Pakistan had
around 60 nuclear weapons, and perhaps additional HEU that could be weaponized.60 By
late 2009 however, analysts had increased that number to between 70-90 warheads.61 It
should be noted that at various times unnamed government sources have claimed
Pakistan’s arsenal is significantly underestimated in the open literature. 62 It is also often
unclear from the open literature whether estimates apply to weapons grade material or
finished cores.63 This article estimates that as of January 2010 Pakistan has enough
weapons grade material for between 100-158 weapons, with a narrower (and more
speculative) estimate of 123-129 warheads (see notes 58 and 62 for further discussion). It
is ultimately unclear precisely how much of the material has been fabricated into the
cores and constituent elements of the weapons, though this article errs on the side of more
weapons due to the worst case scenario planning associated with nuclear security.
Finally, it is believed that Pakistan maintains its weapons in a disassembled state, with
the core separate from the non-nuclear explosives.
Conclusions about the impact of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons production complex
on larger issues of stability are mostly negative. First, the complex is itself nested in an
unstable environment, which implies multiple and sometimes unseen opportunities for
error. Second, the program is undergoing rapid growth, which again opens the door to
accident and unforeseen consequences. Moreover, the arsenal itself is probably larger
than generally thought, increasing the opportunity for losing control over one or more
weapons. On the positive side, the weapons are thought to be unassembled. One would
assume this is preferred by the United States, though unassembled warheads may be
destabilizing in time of crisis (as well as easier to steal). Recent developments within
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Pakistan’s delivery systems add yet again to at least the short term instability generated
by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Pakistan has assorted methods for delivering its nuclear weapons. It is suspected
of having modified at least 32 F-16s to deliver nuclear weapons. The primary advantage
of the F-16 for Pakistan is its long range. But increasingly Pakistan is developing missile
delivery systems, both ballistic and cruise. Pakistan’s operational missiles do not
currently have the range of the F-16, but Pakistan has missiles entering deployment that
exceed the F-16s range. It can be anticipated the Pakistan will retain its F-16 delivery
option in order to maintain flexibility, but will increasingly depend on its missile delivery
options because of their greater ability to penetrate to the target.64
Although Pakistan may also have modified its Mirage V and A-5 aircraft to
deliver nuclear weapons, the F-16 is the most survivable of its aircraft and thus probably
the primary platform for air delivered weapons. The F-16 has a range of 1,600 km and a
payload of 5,450 kg. Under a 2006 agreement with the United States Pakistan is to
receive 36 more F-16s.65
Pakistan’s missile program includes three operational, nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles, one ballistic missile apparently soon to be operational, and two cruise missiles
under development (see figure 1). Pakistan’s operational ballistic missiles include the
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), the Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4), and the Ghauri (Hatf-5). Most analysts now
believe Pakistan has mastered the ability to miniaturize warheads for missile delivery.66 It
should be noted that open sources vary greatly on the characteristics of Pakistan’s
missiles. This article relies upon those characteristics most often cited in the literature.67
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All Pakistani missiles carry only a single warhead. The missiles are not thought to be kept
on operational alert, are not loaded with nuclear weapons (which themselves are not
assembled), and are probably stored separately from the warheads during peacetime.68
During crisis, the warheads would be assembled at one stage of the alert and mated with
their delivery systems at a higher stage of alert. “Integrated teams of military personnel
and nuclear scientists/engineers probably undertake such a task, ensuring organizational
checks and balances, as well as ensuring that no rogue commander or scientist could act
independently of the national command authority.”69
Pakistan’s oldest nuclear capable missile is the Ghaznavi, a solid fuel, road
mobile missile with an approximate range of 300-500 km. It became operational in 1995
and Pakistan is thought to have 30-84 of these missiles. It was derived from the Chinese
M-11.70 It can carry a payload of approximately 500 kg. At least some of these missiles
are based at Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex.71 It is thought that Pakistan now
produces these missiles indigenously at Fatehjung (where China built a turnkey factory in
the mid-1990s).72
Pakistan’s second nuclear capable missile is the Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4). The
Shaheen-1 was derived from the Chinese M-9. This missile may come in two variants,
one with a range of 450 km and the second with a range between 650-750 km. The first
version has a payload of 1,000 kg, while the second is thought to have a payload of 500
kg. The missile is road mobile and solid fueled. It became operational in 2003 but it is not
known how many Shaheen-1s Pakistan possesses. It may be assembled or possibly
produced at a missile plant at Fatehjung (note there are multiple spellings for this
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location). Some sources indicate a high degree of accuracy for this missile (300 meter
circular error probability [CEP]).73
The Ghauri (Hatf-5) is most likely actually a North Korean Nodong missile.
Though it has the greatest range of Pakistan’s operational nuclear capable missiles (7001,500 km), and though it is road mobile, it is liquid fueled. Liquid fueled missiles require
lengthy fueling procedures during which time they may be vulnerable to attack. The
Ghauris became operational in 2002 or 2003. Pakistan is thought to have about 15 such
missiles. It is far less accurate than other delivery systems (2,500 CEP) making it most
useful as a city attack weapon.74
The missile of Pakistan’s future is probably the Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6). This missile
may be derived from the Chinese M-18. It is road mobile and solid fueled. It has a range
of between 2,000 and 2,500 km, allowing it to threaten almost all of India. It has a
payload of 500-1,000 kg. First tested in 2004, it may have GPS guidance. Pakistan is
believed to have 12-15 of these missiles in various stages of completion. The missile
appears to be undergoing its initial deployment in 2009.75
Pakistan also has two cruise missiles under development. The Babur (Hatf-7) is
derived from the Chinese DH-10 (itself thought to be a reverse engineered copy of a US
Tomahawk cruise missile that crashed in Pakistan during the 1998 US cruise missile
attack on Afghanistan).76 The Babur has a range of 500-700 km and a payload of 450 kg.
It is solid fueled and is probably ground launched, though other sources indicate an air
and sea capability.77 If it can indeed be deployed on Pakistan’s Agosta submarine, it will
provide Pakistan with a rudimentary but seemingly secure second strike capability. 78 This
would bring an element of stability to what has heretofore been an unstable nuclear
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relationship vis-à-vis India. It would also allow Pakistan to develop the beginnings of a
triad. Pakistan is thought to have 5-10 of the Babur cruise missiles. They are highly
accurate with a CEP estimated to be 350 meters. The missile was tested in 2005, 2006,
2007, and 2009.
Less is known about Pakistan’s second cruise missile, the Hatf-8 or Ra’ad.79 It is
thought to have a range of 350 km. It is solid fueled and probably air launched. It has
been rumored to have some stealthy characteristics. The air launch capability is important
because it allows launch from Pakistan’s less survivable aircraft and because it extends
the range of whatever aircraft launches the weapon.
In conclusion, according to the open literature, Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal of
about 70-90 weapons and more weapons grade material. It has multiple delivery options.
Pakistan seems to be developing arsenal and delivery options to maximize war fighting
capabilities as opposed to maximizing crisis instability. As with other variables this bodes
poorly for regional stability and therefore also has negative implications for US
security.80 Though little is known about Pakistan’s command and control system, it seems
this element has not advanced as quickly as the weapons and delivery systems.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMAND AND CONTROL
Pakistan’s command and control (C&C) systems and procedures seem less
developed than the other elements of its nuclear weapons program.81 Indeed some assert
that Pakistan made very little effort to develop its C&C or a nuclear doctrine until after it
tested in 1998.82 In February 2000 Pakistan established the National Command Authority
(NCA) to formulate nuclear policy and exercise control “over the employment and
development of all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations.”83 Though this
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system officially includes political leadership, the Pakistani military may well make the
final decisions regarding nuclear use.84 Pakistan has reportedly adopted measures to
avoid unauthorized or accidental use of its nuclear weapons. Procedurally, although a few
assert Pakistan uses a “three-man rule,” most assert a “two-man rule” whereby the use of
nuclear weapons requires the concurrent decision of two people.85 Personnel involved
with Pakistan’s nuclear program are reportedly vetted by four different security
agencies.86 Allegedly no single person can authorize use of nuclear weapons.87
The open literature tells us far less about technical aspects of Pakistan’s C&C
system. It does appear that the United States has provided technical assistance to help
secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons again unauthorized or accidental use.88 Still, it also
seems that Pakistan has not yet developed “secure command and control systems” for its
nuclear forces.89 Instead, and not surprisingly, Pakistan has chosen to focus on
developing the weapons and delivery systems first. The problem with this approach is
that Pakistan’s nuclear forces may be susceptible to decapitation or lack of
communication during a war. During a crisis this may generate pressures to launch.
These pressures will increase even more as conventional hostilities unfold. And of
course, Pakistan does not have the mitigating factors of the early Cold War such as slow
delivery times and long distances to target. Missile flight times between India and
Pakistan may be as short as three minutes.90 There is also some evidence that Pakistan is
using its conventional C&C system for its nuclear forces.91 If this is the case, it may find
its C&C degrading more quickly than a dedicated nuclear C&C system during a
conventional war, again creating incentives for nuclear use or possibly devolution of
launch authority during hostilities. Alternatively, realizing that such a breakdown may
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occur, Pakistan could pre-delegate launch authority as the crisis spins up.92 Many analysts
recognize the need for better C&C.93 Better C&C reduces the risk of unauthorized or
accidental war. But it is simply not possible from open sources to determine the extent of
the need, especially in the technical area. While Pakistan has adopted procedures to
reduce the likelihood of unauthorized or accidental use, it does not appear to have
acquired the technical resources necessary to most fully support this policy. Similarly,
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine does not aim to promote stability first and foremost. Finally
questions remain about its Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), especially given the
increasingly radicalized population from which it draws.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
The weapons, the delivery systems, and the command and control all serve a
state’s nuclear doctrine.94 Unlike India, Pakistan has not released an official version of its
nuclear doctrine in part because Pakistan sees itself as benefiting from ambiguity (see
below).95 Instead, analysts have discerned the outlines of a probable doctrine, while
Pakistani government officials have occasionally seen fit to comment on doctrine,
allowing analysts to refine their understanding. It is likely that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine
focuses almost entirely on India.96
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine rests on at least three primary assumptions. First, as
demonstrated from the crises reviewed above, Pakistani officials believe nuclear
deterrence has worked to prevent Indian aggression in the past and that an existential
deterrent relationship is developing in Southwest Asia.97 Second, India clearly has
conventional superiority and Pakistan lacks strategic depth, thus first use of nuclear
weapons may be necessary for Pakistan.98 Third, ambiguity about what might trigger first
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use is valuable in maintaining the general peace.99 To some extent this approach mirrors
the US policy during the Cold War regarding the potential first use of nuclear weapons in
the face of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Europe. Fundamentally then, Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons are designed to deter war with India and to prevent catastrophic defeat
should war somehow come about. There are two primary prongs to Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons doctrine.
Prong one identifies the major elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons doctrine.
The doctrine may be identified as “credible minimum deterrence” or “dynamic minimum
deterrence.”100 It is dynamic because it has no hard and fast numbers. 101 Rather, the
number of weapons necessary to maintain a minimum deterrent change as the threats
Pakistan faces change. For example, if India increases its nuclear capabilities, Pakistan
may need to increase its capabilities (including warhead numbers) to maintain deterrence.
Less obviously, if India achieves some level of conventional counterforce capability,
Pakistan may have to modify its nuclear force structure. Indeed, even if India only
increases its conventional capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan’s conventional forces, Pakistan
may be forced to upgrade its nuclear forces so as to maintain acceptable levels of
existential deterrence. It follows then that Pakistan’s deterrent posture is “proportional” to
India’s nuclear (and other) advancement. While this may make sense from Pakistan’s
position, it is in at least one sense destabilizing. It is destabilizing because India has a
second potential nuclear foe in China. Thus as India moves to reach acceptable levels of
deterrence vis-à-vis China, it is in fact driving Pakistani expansion, which in turn breeds
insecurity and further arming in India.102 This is the classic security dilemma leading to
an arms race. In fact Southwest Asia is currently in the midst of a nuclear arms race.
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Even if an arms race does not necessarily lead to war, it is still expensive and practically
guarantees negative externalities.103 Moreover, there are continuing concerns about the
security of Pakistan’s weapons and further expansion is likely to exacerbate these
vulnerabilities.
The second major prong provides some hints regarding when Pakistan might use
nuclear weapons (beyond simply responding to a nuclear attack). Lieutenant General
Khalid Kidwai during an interview listed four times when Pakistan might use nuclear
weapons. These were: 1) Pakistan suffers large territorial losses; 2) India destroys a large
portion of Pakistan’s army; 3) India engages in “economic strangulation” (this may be
referring to a blockade); and, 4) India engages in serious political destabilization.104
Pakistan might also use nuclear weapons to prevent “Pakistan’s adversaries from
attempting a counter-force strategy against our strategic assets, by effectively securing
our strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation should such an attempt be
made.”105 This statement is meant to deter either nuclear or conventional counterforce
attacks by India.106 It is noteworthy that even as set forth above these are still fairly vague
descriptions of what might lead to nuclear use by Pakistan. This vagueness is by design:
Pakistan wants to create uncertainty in the minds of India’s policy makers and therefore
maximize the benefits of existential deterrence. Retired Lieutenant General Sardar FS
Lodi has added some specificity to what sort of military set back would almost certainly
evoke a nuclear response. He notes that in “a deteriorating military situation when an
Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defenses or has already breached
the main defense line causing a major setback to the defenses, which cannot be restored
by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no other option
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except to use nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation.”107 Pakistan’s stated willingness
to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict, which in turn would likely cause
Indian retaliation and all out nuclear war, is thought to reduce the probability of
conventional war from starting in the first place.108 Lodi’s statements do not reduce
ambiguity however, because there are many other situations in which the weapons might
be used. Even those who claim Pakistan’s doctrine excludes warfighting, note target
options that include “a number of major Indian cities, military installations, command
and control headquarters, battlefield targets, communications centers, etc.”109
There are at least two conclusions that may be drawn from what is understood
about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons doctrine. First, while Pakistan claims there is no race
for quantitative equality, clearly force ratios matter as do qualitative factors. Pakistan
cannot afford to fall too far behind because this may allow India to reduce uncertainty
and provide greater opportunity to manipulate Pakistani behavior. While this may seem
somewhat absurd from an outsider’s perspective, one must remember that when facing a
nuclear-armed foe almost all states (including the US) engage in worst-case scenario
analysis. Second, Pakistan is likely to try to take advantage of asymmetries in its conflict
with India so as to minimize India’s obvious military, economic, and demographic
advantages. These asymmetries might include technological advantages such as mobile
missiles, allies such as China, ambiguity in declaratory policy, and even “asymmetric soft
power” inasmuch as militant Islam seems to be creating sympathies from the world wide
(and Indian) Muslim community.
Since acquiring nuclear capability, first oblique and later explicit, Pakistan has
avoided large-scale war with India. Pakistani authorities see this as evidence that nuclear
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weapons work to deter aggression. But Pakistan continues to fear India economic,
conventional, and nuclear strength. Consequently, Pakistan continues extensive
development of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. Pakistan has done less
to develop effective command and control for its arsenal. Less yet is known about the
security of the weapons themselves. Thus, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is an
immature program. This immature program complicates US policy in the region and
beyond.
The United States has a direct interest in the Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
First, since the end of the Second World War the US has provided certain collective
goods for the international community such as an open economic system and zones of
peace that allow for continued economic development. A nuclear war in Southwest Asia
would do severe damage to those collective goods. Second, the US is itself engaged in a
global war against militant Islamists, many of whom find safe haven in Pakistan. These
militants seek to acquire and use nuclear weapons against the US and its allies. Third, the
US is engaged in wars within two of Pakistan’s neighbors. For all these reasons, the US
has a very direct interest in what occurs within Pakistan and especially within Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program. The following sections examine the challenges to US national
security arising out of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as well as synergistic
interactions between these challenges.
CHALLENGES TO US SECURITY
There are at least six related challenges to US security that arise out of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program. The challenges are as follows:
1.

The ongoing arms race in Southwest Asia;
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2.

Proliferation out of Pakistan;

3.

Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics, including but not limited to, the possibility of

accidental or unauthorized war;
4.

War with India;

5.

Islamist influence in Pakistan and infiltration into key sectors of society; and,

6.

State failure in Pakistan.

It is difficult to precisely rank these in terms danger. Later, this article places challenges
on two axes (danger and likelihood) (see figure 2). Though these challenges are
recognized in the literature, their synergistic interaction gets far less attention. Similarly,
little is said about how these challenges are heightened by the immature nature of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal. These points are important because they imply that
the United States can mitigate some of these dangers more than is generally recognized.
US action to further develop certain aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program could
relieve stress on those US security interests threatened by immaturity as well as
depressurize the synergistic nature of certain security challenges. It is these synergistic
challenges that in fact cause the most dangerous and unpredictable threats to the United
States.
1.

The Ongoing Arms Race in Southwest Asia
The question here is less one of potential and more one of the costs and

consequences of a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. There is little doubt that a
nuclear arms race is underway between Pakistan and India (and to a lesser extent
China).110 Pakistan is engaged in expanding its ability to produce plutonium. Increased
plutonium production points to both the quantitative addition of more warheads as well as
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the qualitative addition of higher yield and/or smaller warheads. In the long-term, it may
indicate a desire to cross the thermonuclear threshold.111 Pakistan continues to enrich
uranium and improve delivery platforms. For example, Pakistan is enhancing its missile
delivery options. The Shaheen-2 will hold almost all of India at risk. Pakistan is also
developing two cruise missiles. This effectively extends the range of Pakistan’s aircraft,
improves their survivability, and increases the likelihood that the weapons will reach
their Indian targets.112 India is attempting to match or exceed Pakistani capabilities, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, across the board.113
Arms races are often claimed to start wars, though there is little evidence to
support this contention. In the case of Pakistan, some of the primary dangers are as
follows. First, a nuclear arms race diverts badly needed funding from social projects
including an improved education system, economic development, health care, and other
infrastructure. Second, any war that occurs on the subcontinent and involves nuclear
weapons will surely kill untold millions, severely damage the world economy, and
therefore indirectly kill more. Third, more weapons increase the likelihood of
unauthorized access. Fourth, the arms race has created immature arsenals that are
themselves subject to accident, unauthorized use, and/or miscalculation (see below). The
race is occurring at the “sharp end of the spear.” But the command and control that has to
guide the spear has been neglected.114 Consequently, mistakes and miscalculation,
especially during crisis, are more likely. This fourth set of problems underscores the
synergistic quality of the challenges resulting from recent developments in Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal. Somewhat counter-intuitively, an arms race that goes only half way (i.e.,
one that neglects C&C) actually increases the dangers of mistaken war and thus
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endangers US security interests. So if US actions could enhance Pakistani C&C
capabilities the chances of war (and other threats such as illicit seizure of weapons) might
in reality be reduced.
Another challenge that interacts synergistically is proliferation. Nuclear
proliferation has allowed Pakistan to upgrade its nuclear weapons arsenal by exchanging
nuclear weapons knowledge for other needed technology, such as delivery vehicles. Here
US nonproliferation strategy has actually increased proliferation. Rather than limiting
proliferation to Pakistan, the US refusal to provide Pakistan other technology forced
Pakistan to trade with and assist the nuclear programs of states like North Korea and Iran.
Simplistic, one dimensional and unimaginative US foreign policy (influenced far too
often by uninformed public opinion) has bred additional security threats.
2.

Proliferation out of Pakistan115
A.Q. Khan was implicated in 2004 in a widespread nuclear technology

proliferation ring.116 Though Pakistan’s government denied involvement, most observers
believe the proliferation ring could not have existed without approval of higher Pakistani
authorities.117 It seems logical that Pakistan would trade nuclear technology to Iran and
North Korea in exchange for help with missile development. 118 In fact, the Pakistani
Ghauri is generally regarded as a copy of the No-Dong (North Korea) or possibly the
Shahab 3 (Iran).119 Although Khan has been removed from positions of power, the United
States has never been allowed to interrogate him. It is therefore impossible for the US to
determine the true nature and extent of the proliferation ring.
Certainly many individuals associated with the ring remain at large.120 This
implies that parts of the ring are dormant and subject to awakening at a later time. This
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would allow Pakistan to begin proliferation activities again. One way this might happen
is if the US were to again disengage from Pakistan as it has done in the past (for example
under a Pressler Amendment decertification by the George H. W. Bush administration).
Although a high profile relationship between the US and Pakistan probably increases
discontent across the larger Pakistani society, the US nevertheless needs to remain close
with the army and more moderate sectors of society.
If the US disengages, it should expect proliferation incentives to grow because
Pakistan will have to find other sources from which to acquire those assets deemed
necessary to its security needs. Pakistan can afford to forgo certain developments if the
United States is engaged and perceived to be providing security.121 The quid pro quo for
such US involvement, from the Pakistani viewpoint, is the necessity to avoid more
egregious breaches of nuclear arms control regimes. Pakistan’s military can live with this
bargain only so long as the US provides security through engagement.
Of course, too much US involvement could also lead to undesired results. Overt
and heavy handed US involvement is likely to trigger a backlash in Pakistani society
against the United States and any cooperating Pakistani government. Rather, the US
should increase the use of soft power, making the United States more attractive to
Pakistan.122 This is a long term approach, but one that must begin immediately and take
center-stage as perhaps the key US objective in Pakistan (along with educational reform).
Meanwhile, unobtrusive engagement is particularly desirable. Obviously area specialists
need to be consulted on short- and long-term engagement. But certainly training more
Pakistani officers (and perhaps even rank-and-file) in the United States and reopening US
universities to Pakistanis would help.123 One risk for the United States in becoming too
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obviously involved in Pakistan is that Pakistani society may react as Iranian society did in
1979.
A revolution or state failure in Pakistan encouraged in part by too much US
involvement would be catastrophic.124 Depending on the nature of such a revolution, it
might be that the government itself would not seek to provide nuclear weapons to radical
nonstate actors, but that elements within the now fractured Pakistani state would
reactivate the proliferation ring and provide nuclear knowledge to untrustworthy states
and perhaps even nonstate actors. Even if the transfer were limited to states unfriendly to
the US, these states in turn might transfer nuclear materials to nonstate actors.125 And all
of this presupposes that radicals themselves do not gain firm control of Pakistan, in which
case they may simply provide weapons to nonstate actors directly. These eventualities
again demonstrate the synergistic nature of these challenges. Similarly, proper US policy,
either by reducing incentives to proliferate by providing security to Pakistan, by
enhancing economic growth within Pakistan (especially by improving Pakistan’s
education system), or by reducing the effectiveness of malcontents in Pakistan, would
have positive synergistic impacts across linked policy issues. 126 In turn, the security of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex would be enhanced and threats to the US reduced.
3.

Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics, including but not limited to, the possibility of

accidental or unauthorized war
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is best characterized as an immature arsenal. For
example, its delivery systems do not offer a secure second strike capability. Its F-16s are
increasingly vulnerable to Indian anti-aircraft measures and/or a first strike.127 Its most
effective missile, the Shaheen-2, may be in the initial stages of deployment, but is not
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widely deployed as of this writing. As a result, the arsenal is currently unable to threaten
with high probability much of India, and especially those areas where India’s nuclear
weapons establishment is located. Thus to maximize effectiveness, Pakistan’s current
arsenal must be deployed close to the border, making it vulnerable to Indian attack, and
therefore creating a strong incentive for Pakistan to use the arsenal early or risk losing it.
The problem of immature delivery systems will slowly begin to dissipate as the Shaheen2 is deployed.128
Pakistan’s warhead cores appear to be kept separate from the detonation
components, as noted above. But they are likely stored in close proximity to each other so
that they may be quickly assembled during crisis. Similarly, it can be surmised that the
delivery vehicles to which the warheads must be mated are also located close to the
warheads. This raises questions of how easy it would be for the various components to be
destroyed in a first strike or perhaps seized by militants. Though many scoff at the notion
of militants seizing nuclear weapon materials, many of the weapon components appear to
be stored in western Pakistan closer to militant sympathetic areas. Moreover, the militants
have shown an ability to infiltrate Rawalpindi and other Punjab strongholds. It is thus not
a foregone conclusion that the weapons are safe from militants. All of these challenges
are heightened during any sort of crisis when the military might have to assemble and
move the weapons, making them more vulnerable to seizure and easier to use.129
Another problem for Pakistan’s immature arsenal is the process by which it
moves from peacetime deployment to crisis mobilization. As others have noted, this
transition crystallizes Peter Feaver’s “always/never” dichotomy.130 Any state wants its
nuclear weapons to “never” be used when not authorized, but to “always” work when so
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ordered. The two goals create tension. Pakistan apparently maintains its peacetime
arsenal decoupled from launch vehicles and its warheads disassembled. This deployment
status maximizes the goal of never allowing unauthorized use of the weapons (though the
cores may be more vulnerable to illicit seizure than if mated with delivery vehicles).
However this deployment approach also makes the weapons vulnerable to a first strike. It
is not just the cores that are vulnerable; the other components and delivery vehicles are
vulnerable as well. At various stages of a crisis, the weapons are apparently put on
increasingly heightened stages of alert and at different points also assembled, coupled
with their delivery vehicles, and finally prepared for launch. While this is supposed to be
stepwise process reflecting slowly building alert status similar to the US DEFCON
approach, in past crises the process appears hurried through (increasing the chance for
accident or unintended use). Even if done in a slow and steady fashion, the movement
from peacetime to mobilization is dangerous in and of itself.131 Some have argued the
move from decoupled to coupled status may be more dangerous than simply maintaining
deployed weapons.132 Beyond this, once mobilization has been achieved, while the
weapons and delivery vehicles become less vulnerable (the “always” factor increases),
the possibility of unauthorized or accidental use increases, as does the chance of
miscalculation (the “never” factor decreases).133 But the problem is even more
complicated for Pakistan than for most states because of its immature C&C system.134
Pakistan’s strategic C&C systems are underdeveloped. Regarding control, there
are persistent questions about the day-to-day security of the arsenal.135 Regarding
command, it appears there may be “significant overlap between Pakistan’s normal
conventional command and control structures that would be subject to attack in a large-
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scale war and its strategic command and control structure.”136 Thus Pakistan may find its
nuclear C&C being attrited during conventional hostilities. This might force Pakistan’s
leadership to consider ordering the early use of nuclear weapons or possibly devolving
launch authority.137 Intra-war stability would be threatened in either case. Other
destabilizing alternatives include pre-delegation or adopting a launch on warning policy.
Some even argue launch authority has been granted to field commanders during crises.138
Beyond this crisis-centric concern, there are other endemic weaknesses in Pakistan’s
strategic C&C structure.
There is room for improvement on both the procedural and the technical ends of
Pakistan’s C&C system.139 On the procedural end, the effectiveness of Pakistan’s PRP is
unclear.140 The program appears rigorous and has been adapted to Pakistan’s challenges.
For example, it pays special attention to religious fundamentalism, as opposed to
focusing on issues like alcohol, as in the United States. Further, the Pakistanis are thought
to recruit largely from the Punjab, “who are thought to be less sympathetic to Islamist
ideas…”141 Still, the program is even more secretive than the US PRP and thus it is
impossible to determine the program’s effectiveness. It is possible that the program has
failed to completely eliminate individuals whose interests and goals do not conform to
official Pakistan state goals. In such a case this could lead to compromised security,
perhaps during mobilization (or during social instability). The two (or three) person
launch rule should work effectively to prevent unauthorized launch unless the PRP has
been seriously compromised.142 But the two (or three) person launch rule does nothing to
prevent an erroneous launch order (especially if launch authority has been devolved or
pre-delegated). Finally, the standard operating procedures for assembling weapons and

34

mating them to launch vehicles are of unknown character. They may or may not reflect
best practices.143
It seems clearer yet that the technical end of Pakistan’s C&C system is in need of
assistance. While the US has apparently provided some technical assistance, this
assistance is limited by national and international law.144 One area in which the US has
shared technology is physical security.145 But in general, it appears that the technology
for Pakistan’s C&C system remains insufficient. The Pakistanis need assistance with
modern communications equipment that can operate after an EMP event, they need early
warning equipment, they need equipment that can determine where and how many
nuclear weapons have detonated, they need state-of-the-art permissive action links
(PALs) or similar technology, and so forth.146 The problem with such recommendations,
in addition to legal, is that the Pakistanis have also been wary of sharing information that
is necessary to make some US technology transfers (e.g., PALs) effective. Some in the
US might also worry about transfer of technology to the Chinese or others.
In peacetime Pakistan’s C&C system may remain somewhat vulnerable to
compromise by unreliable personnel or perhaps to a “bolt from the blue” attack. But
barring massive social instability, the greatest concerns arise during a mobilization when
the system’s procedural and technological vulnerabilities are themselves buffeted by
synergistic forces. This article examines two iterations of Pakistan’s C&C weaknesses
during mobilization, though others exist.
First, as Pakistan’s nuclear forces are deployed, they are put on what is essentially
a hair-trigger.147 The problems with a nuclear hair-trigger are well known, but they are
complicated for Pakistan because it has inadequate early warning systems. Pakistan is
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therefore in the unenviable position of being on a “blind hair trigger.” The situation is
further complicated in that, because of Pakistan’s immature C&C, we may see predelegation or possibly devolution of launch authority. Knowing Pakistan is on a blind
hair trigger may in turn tempt India to strike first. The end result is heightened crisis
instability, perhaps to a level never reached before in the history of nuclear conflict.
When combined with the close proximity of India, with religious differences, and with
historical animosity unparalleled even during the Cold War, it is not difficult to imagine
an undesired nuclear war starting.148
The second iteration follows the first, but presupposes an Indian conventional
counterforce capability. It would be surprising if India did not attempt to eliminate as
much of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex as possible during the opening stages of
any serious conventional conflict (something larger than Kargil). In that case and
combined with the factors set forth above, Pakistan will have an incentive to use its
weapons and to use them early. Again, the result of this is heightened crisis instability.
In closing this section, it should be noted that immature arsenals may mature over
time.149 If Pakistan invests in dedicated strategic C&C, if it continues to improve its
procedures, if it can develop a secure second strike capability, and if it can increase
weapon survivability while resisting deployment postures that encourage early use, the
subcontinent could in the future enter a period of far greater stability: existential
deterrence will itself solidify.150 For the US this implies policies that improve Pakistan’s
arsenal in ways that address the problems set forth in the previous sentence even though
this may be politically unpopular and legally challenging. But Pakistan will have to pass
through troubled waters before it reaches greater stability. Synergistic interactions with
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other security challenges during the period of immaturity, moreover, could lead to
nuclear war.
4.

War with India
War between Pakistan and India would harm US national security interests in

assorted ways, including inter alia economic costs and the implications of a large-scale
war between civilizations. It is not difficult to imagine war breaking out between the
states and the last 60 years have borne this possibility out.151
The crises since 1986-87 indicate that nuclear saber rattling plays a large role
once a Southwest Asian crisis begins. Although each of the crises was serious, none
involved large-scale, border-length violence. Thus one might distinguish between limited
war (e.g., Kargil) or less (e.g., Brasstacks) on the one hand, and large-scale warfare on
the other hand. While a limited war could escalate into a nuclear exchange, the greater
concern is a large-scale war. Such a large scale war is less likely to occur, but carries
greater danger of nuclear use were it to occur. To be sure, though a limited war could
“slip” into a nuclear exchange through accident, miscalculation, or otherwise, it is more
likely that such a limited war would first escalate into significantly larger-scale
conventional violence. Consequently while any type of crisis is to be avoided, it is large
scale conflict that carries the greatest concern.
Any large-scale conflict between India and Pakistan is likely to involve the use of
nuclear weapons. Indeed India will almost certainly attempt to engage in conventional
counterforce attacks to minimize Pakistan capabilities. Knowing this, Pakistan will have
an incentive for early use, especially given their weaknesses in C&C. Even if the states
successfully negotiate this stage, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine indicates it will use nuclear
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weapons to forestall a major defeat, which would be the probable end stage in any such
war. The synergistic combination of inherent animosity, a history of nuclear threats
during crisis, an immature arsenal and an aggressive nuclear doctrine makes it unlikely
the states could survive a major conflict without using nuclear weapons.
The question of limited war between India and Pakistan is more hopeful, though
still generates the risk of nuclear release. Here, if Kargil is indicative, India at least has
resolved to avoid threatening Pakistan with overt escalation. India retook the mountain
positions at greater loss of life than might have been necessary had it escalated vertically
(to the wider use of weaponry) or horizontally (opening a new front and forcing Pakistan
to divert resources from Kargil). Nevertheless there is ample room for limited war to
escalate to greater conventional conflict (with the likelihood of nuclear use then growing)
or for some miscalculation leading to use or unauthorized use to occur. The synergies
discussed above arise again in limited conflict.
Though war with India is always a concern, instability in Pakistan is a more
immediate worry. If Pakistan were to enter a period of sustained, extensive social
instability, violent Islamists would almost certainly play a central role. The likelihood of
violent Islamists negatively impacting the nuclear weapons complex will most likely
depend upon their influence over three key sectors of Pakistani society.
5.

Islamist influence in Pakistan and infiltration into key sectors of society
Although Pakistani society is complex, this section focuses on Islamist influence

within three sectors of society that have unique connection with the county’s nuclear
weapons program: the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (the ISI), the military,
and nuclear weapons scientists and technicians. Open sources do not provide much data
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regarding the depth of Islamist influence on these three sectors, though certainly Islamist
influence exists. This article distinguishes between infiltration, which implies deeply
committed Islamists holding key positions within a given sector, and sympathy for
Islamists’ views from within a given sector, which implies less commitment, but the
potential for individuals within a sector to support certain Islamist goals. Infiltration
opens the way for direct cooperation with Islamists. Sympathy makes indirect support
more likely. Infiltration is discussed first.
Each of the three sectors examined has suffered some level of infiltration by
Islamists. The evidence is least clear in the case of the ISI. Though undoubtedly members
of the ISI are sympathetic to Islamists (see below), the extent to which Islamists have
infiltrated the ISI and can therefore provide counterintelligence opportunities, or even
influence operations, is simply unknown. Examples that indicate some level of
infiltration include those like the 4 September and 24 November 2007 attacks on buses
carrying ISI employees. These attacks imply inside knowledge of the bus routes and
passengers. Similarly other attacks on the ISI imply inside knowledge, though this
knowledge could probably have been provided by low level ISI employees or even
through careful surveillance. It has been noted elsewhere that some ISI operatives may be
assisting Islamists and even Al Qaeda.152 The suicide bombing attack on the Indian
embassy in Kabul (July 2008) is noteworthy as are the Mumbai attacks (November
2008). Finally, a number of ISI employees have been purged from the agency as a result
of sympathies toward militant Islamists.153 At some point sympathy turns into active
support, which thus suggests infiltration. Alternatively, the US and the ISI have
cooperated for a number of stunning intelligence successes in Pakistan, especially against
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Al Qaeda (though far few successes have occurred in recent years).154 Pakistan’s tacit and
sometimes overt assistance to the Taliban in its Afghan insurgency is widely thought to
emanate from the ISI, though this may be more indicative of a foreign policy goal (an
Afghanistan hostile to India) rather than infiltration of the ISI by Islamists.
There is more data on the level of Islamist infiltration into Pakistan’s military.
Certainly the links between the military and violent Islamists strengthened during the war
with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, as well as since the 1980s in Kashmir. It is
reasonable to assume that some in the military are active Islamists as well. During the
General Zia ul Haq years some even spoke of a “military-mullah alliance.”155 Since 9/11
there have been purges of senior military leaders who were also Islamists.156 But one
cannot eliminate the infiltration of decades in a few short years. To wit, former officers
have been arrested in raids on militants again indicating infiltration of the military.
Additionally, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed “was captured in the ‘safe house’ of a serving
military officer with close family links to the Islamist political party Jamaat-I-Islami…
having previously been kept, moved and protected by a network of Pakistan military
officers linked only by their Islamist beliefs.”157 At least two assassination attempts on
Musharraf were alleged to have inside military assistance.158 It seems clear there has been
significant infiltration into at least the junior officer corps and rank-and-file.159 Recent
attacks in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and on military bases also imply inside assistance.160
Moreover, as Pakistani society has become more accepting of Islamists views, so too
would be those conscripted into the military from this society. This may be particularly
true of the roughly one-quarter of the military (including 15-22% of the officer corps)
made up of Pashtuns (the same ethnic group straddling the Pakistani/Afghan border and
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providing the bulk of the membership to the Taliban).161 Pashtuns have been especially
Islamized by Pakistani state policy over the last 30 years. Thus they provide a fertile
source of likely Islamist infiltration, at least at the rank-and-file level of the military.
Pashtuns also make up a significant proportion of Frontier Corp personnel who serve in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).162 This ethnic division presents the
potential for a split within the military, though this is not thought likely by most analysts
at this point. Similarly, officers who rose “through the ranks in the post-Zia era” are
likely to have faced greater Islamist influence.163 All of this indicates not just sympathies
for Islamists, but the prospect that Islamists now occupy increasingly important positions
within the military – that they have truly infiltrated the military. But there is contra
evidence as well.
The military and especially the officer corps should be expected to be antiIslamist because increased Islamist power would reduce military power. In particular, the
upper-level of the officer class has benefited greatly from its military service. Heads of
universities, key government positions, and key bureaucratic positions are each a de facto
benefit for senior military service.164 These benefits would disappear with a significant
increase in Islamist power, thus we can expect the military to attempt to prevent
infiltration that might weaken the military. Similarly, recent attempts on the lives of key
military officials are likely to make the military itself wary of potential Islamist
infiltration. Furthermore, the military sees itself as the guardian of the Pakistani state. To
the extent that an Islamist take-over threatens that role, it should be expected that the
military would attempt to limit Islamist influence.
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The status of Islamist infiltration into the nuclear weapons establishment is less
clear. Certainly the establishment was infiltrated into its upper echelon of scientists at one
point. A.Q. Khan and others have made their affinity for Islamists’ concerns clear. Top
level scientists, including Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Majid Ali visited Al Qaeda
when the Taliban held power in Afghanistan. These individuals may have recruited
scientists from the nuclear weapons complex.165 On the other side of the ledger,
Musharraf purged the nuclear weapons establishment after 9/11. Current civilian
leadership seems to appreciate the danger of militant Islam, as does Army Chief of Staff
Kayani. Additionally, employees have been reassigned and/or terminated under
Pakistan’s revamped PRP, though how effective this program is in an increasingly
“Islamist-sympathetic” society is unclear. It is thus ultimately difficult to discern the true
extent of infiltration here, though it is probable that infiltration continues.
Societal sectors may not have been thoroughly infiltrated, but may still have
sympathies for the Islamists’ agenda. For example, it seems clear that there is notable
sympathy for Islamists within the ISI.166 The ISI has long used Islamists to support its
agenda in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The ISI played a key role in the very creation of the
Taliban.167 The ISI has also been alleged to have helped rebuild Islamist militants in
Northwest Pakistan after the United States toppled the Taliban regime. The ISI has not
been “proactive” in providing the West with intelligence, has been “unhelpful in relation
to specific investigations – most notably 7/7 and 21/7…” has “restricted or denied the
US/UK access to many alleged terrorists…” and may even “misdirect” Western
intelligence services.168 The ISI is sympathetic to Islamists because Islamists further ISI
agendas such as weakening India and keeping pressure on Kashmir.169
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Yet, the ISI also played a key role in capturing Al Qaeda operatives including
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.170 Thus it may be somewhat useful to distinguish between
ISI sympathy for the Taliban and similar “regional Islamists” on the one hand, and
international Islamists such as Al Qaeda, on the other hand. 171 Still, even support for
regional Islamists may threaten Pakistan’s stability and therefore put its nuclear weapons
at risk with attendant perils to US national security.
Radical Islamist groups provide a key regional foreign policy tool for Pakistan
and the ISI. These militants are perceived as valuable in promoting ISI goals in
Afghanistan and Kashmir. The ISI is loath to abandon such tools when US long-term
support could wane.172 Moreover, close relationships have been built between the ISI and
the militants in support of regional goals and more than a few ISI members agree with the
long-term ideological goals of the militants.173 A key question then is whether the
militant attacks on the ISI and the broader Pakistani state could so alienate the ISI that it
throws its lot in with the West. At this writing, though elements within the ISI recognize
the dangers posed by radical Islamists, they continue to be wary of cooperation with the
West, on both pragmatic and philosophical levels. Pragmatically, any association with the
West and especially the US is profoundly unpopular with the Pakistani masses.
Philosophically, the attraction of a more austere form of Islam is strong among elements
within the ISI.174
Pakistan’s military, too, has a mixed record of sympathy for Islamists.175 On the
pro-Islamist side of the ledger, the military has a long history of supporting Islamists to
further its domestic and international ambitions. These connections are viewed “as a
hedge against abandonment by Washington.”176 A significant number are thought to
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sympathize directly “with the politics of Salafist Islamism.”177 Furthermore, the military
has repeatedly shown an unwillingness and/or inability to assert control over northwest
Pakistan. Moreover, the military recruits from an increasingly radicalized society,
indicating its personnel may be increasingly radicalized (not just Pashtuns). Such troops
have shown a disturbing proclivity to surrender without fighting in the tribal areas.
Finally, the military was cutoff from the US between 1990 and 2002. Even now, the level
of US contact with the Pakistani military remains low.178 Previously, contacts between
Pakistan’s military and the United States tended to moderate the Pakistani military,
especially among the officer corps that was able to train with the US.
On the other side of the ledger, the Pakistani Army attacked the Islamist held Red
Mosque (though admittedly this attack was carried out primarily by elite units thought to
be least susceptible to Islamists). In 2008-2009 the military began a more systematic
effort to rid the tribal areas of anti-government forces including foreign fighters and at
least some elements of the Pakistani Taliban. As a result, the military has found itself
increasingly targeted by militants (October 2009). Sympathy for violent Islamist views
may wane as a result of these attacks. In fact there is evidence that the military views
itself as increasingly threatened by Islamism.179 Senior officers with Islamist leanings
were purged by Musharraf.180 Moreover, the military has benefited economically through
its control of the country and is not likely to relinquish such control (and wealth) to
anyone, democrats or Islamists.181
There is also evidence that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons establishment has some
sympathies for Islamists. Some scientists have had connections with radical Islamists. It
is likely that these scientists also attempted to recruit other Pakistanis scientists to assist
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militants or at least engaged in Islamist proselytizing.182 The problem may be exacerbated
by a lack of access to Western education institutions.
On the other hand, the government has removed a number of Islamist-oriented
scientists. Moreover, personnel security has been heightened within the program, as well
as physical security. Better auditing procedures have been introduced and export controls
have been improved.183 Given the Pakistan’s perception of the threat posed by India,
however, it is doubtful that attempts to remove such Islamist influences go so far as to
reduce the program’s effectiveness. Put another way, the efficacy of the nuclear weapons
program surely wins out when weighed against Islamist influences.
The question arising out of this conjecture is how will these institutions react to
increasing social instability? Infiltration of these institutions, or sympathies from within,
both imply that Islamists could find willing allies during times of social upheaval. But
infiltration implies a more overt role on behalf of the institution serving Islamists, while
sympathies imply more passive acquiescence. In the case of the ISI or the military, this
could be a key tipping point. Assistance from military units securing nuclear weapons is
especially worrisome. In the case of the nuclear weapons establishment, social volatility
could lead to the leakage of weapons and/or technology. Or perhaps insiders could assist
in breaching security measures, such as by disabling PALs. Here, one example of
negative synergy is an immature arsenal driven forward during an arms race and nested in
social instability.
6.

State failure in Pakistan
The radicalization of Pakistani society is not limited to the tribal areas but is a

countrywide phenomenon. The number of madrassas had, by one estimate, expanded
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from 7,000 in 2000 to 13,000-14,000 in 2006.184 While by most accounts a large majority
of the schools do not all produce jihadists, it seems clear that a number of the schools do
and even more advocate a world-view that is distinctly hostile to the West. Government
attempts to “reorient the curricula of many of these Madaris away from jihadi
radicalization have largely failed with around 35 percent of the Madaris still not even
registered under the government scheme.”185 Perhaps more importantly, the governmentrun and privately-run schools also have an intolerant and anti-Western curriculum. The
radicalization of Pakistani society is most notable though in the tribal areas. Pakistan’s
government has essentially abandoned its polio elimination campaign due to resistance
by militants.186 The US presence in southwest and Central Asia surely contributes to the
radicalization of local society, especially among Pashtuns about whom observers often
speak of “creeping Talibanization…”187 This results in the possibility of “’Pashtun
nationalism fusing with Islamism...’” increasing the likelihood of international jihadists
rather than only regional jihadists.188 Already Pashtun jihadists in the Afghan border
areas are making common cause with Punjabi jihadists originally focused on Kashmir
and India.189 In addition to Islamist support among the people, those areas that enjoy
representation in Pakistan’s parliament (such as the NWFP, as opposed to the FATA)
often boost political leadership that is also sympathetic to Islamists such as the Taliban, if
not Al Qaeda directly.190 Islam throughout southwest Asia has arguably become less
tolerant.191 Even in the more urbane areas such as Quaid-e Azam University in
Islamabad, “hijabs and burqas have increasingly become the norm…”192 And as the
radicalization of society increases, the strength of the central government wanes. As a
result we repeatedly see the central government attempting to make deals with militants
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in the tribal areas. The government also assents to Islamists demands in order to appease
Islamists or to bolster its own religion credentials. For example, in recent years the
government has begun imposing Islamic studies for children earlier than in the past,
countering moderate Islamic scholars who argued such you children could become “rigid
and doctrinaire.” Similarly, in 2007 the “federal minister for religions affairs... argued
that anyone who did not believe in jihad was neither a Muslim nor a Pakistani.” 193
Support for both Osama bin Laden and the sharia is high and rising in Pakistan.194 Some
even argue an Islamic revolution is already underway.195
Of course one cannot be certain that Pakistan is headed for revolution or state
failure. Even within the most radicalized areas, tribal differences exist that inhibit
cooperation.196 Astute policy might accentuate these differences, rather than
amalgamating groups. Similarly, while certainly Pashtun nationalism is rampant, it is not
clear that this must lead to international jihad. Traditional Pashtun culture remains alive
even as foreign and local Islamists increase their strength in the region. 197 The trends are
troubling, but it is not clear that the Pashtuns in particular, or Pakistani society in general,
is unwavering in its desire to move toward an Islamic state. Thus the state may be able to
retain the people’s support if it is viewed as serving the people.
Nevertheless, Pakistan is clearly becoming more unstable. The tribal areas are
virtually ungovernable. Since the assault on the Red Mosque suicide attacks have
occurred across the country, in urban areas as well as rural areas. These have continued in
the face of Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas during 2008-2009. Heretofore
untouchable entities, such as the ISI and the military now come under attack. Although
many argue the military (and particularly the Army) can maintain control over Pakistan,
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there is an increasingly likelihood (if still small) that the military cannot control itself;
that its rank and file is so supportive of Islamist ideas that the Army itself may be suspect,
as the Iranian Army was in 1979.
The synergistic threat from these last two sections arises first from national
instability combined with important sectors of society (e.g., the ISI and the Army) either
supporting Islamists or becoming paralyzed at key moments. Similarly, during great
social upheaval, elements of the nuclear weapons infrastructure might collapse, switch
sides, or otherwise compromise nuclear weapons security and/or technology. Any one of
these eventualities has negative implications for US security. Moreover these variables
could combine with other challenges such as economic meltdown or crisis with India,
again resulting in damage to US national security, perhaps in unanticipated ways.
CONCLUSIONS
The variables and complexities can be overwhelming when examining even a
small section of Pakistan. Figure 2 places the negative eventualities on a chart, estimating
their likelihood of occurrence and the danger caused by any given event. The chart lists
most of these as individual and discrete events, but as this article has tried to make clear,
the greatest danger arises from the synergistic interactions of these events. So, for one
example, state failure combined with Islamist influence may yield the nightmare scenario
for the United States – militant acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, a war with
India, combined with immature arsenals may well yield multiple nuclear explosions on
the subcontinent. Of course, there are other synergies to be examined (including, inter
alia, severe global recession).
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This article has not, in large part, proposed solutions. Rather, this article has tried
to make clear the very real dangers presented by recent developments in Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons program and linked some of these to larger trends in Pakistan. There are
solutions, but time is running short. Just as importantly, some of the most effective
responses such as improving the United State’s image, liberalizing education, and
“maturing” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, will take the longest to put into place. If
any good can come from recent instability in Pakistan, it would be the recognition on the
part of the United States that Pakistan may be the most dangerous country on earth, that it
poses a very serious threat to US national security in the years to come, and that
integrated solutions that take negative synergies into account are necessary now.
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